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AGAINST JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE DECLINE OF FREEDOM
AND DEMOCRACY IN CANADA, by Rory Leishman1
LARA KINKARTZ
AGAINST JUDICIAL ACTIVISM PRESENTS a scathing critique of judicial decisions
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 Rory Leishman argues
that judges and members of human rights tribunals have embraced the Charter
as an excuse for imposing their individual views on Canadians. Throughout
his book, the author asserts that far from protecting democracy, human rights,
and civil liberties, the Charter has threatened these ideals by opening the door
to rampant judicial activism and subordinating the will of elected legislators.
The book opens with a discussion of the relationship between the rule of
law and judicial activism. The author argues that by ignoring the plain language
of the law, judicial activism unjustifiably usurps the role of legislatures, thereby
introducing uncertainty and instability to the law.' The Charter poses unique
challenges for judicial interpretation precisely because it uses broad and general
language; however, Leishman argues that this language should not be used to
grant rights that legislatures have not specifically authorized. Throughout the
rest of the book, he examines specific circumstances in which the courts have
recognized new rights, often in cases where the legislatures have intentionally
declined to extend protection to the rights in question. He argues that these
instances of judicial law making are inherently undemocratic because unelected
judges are overriding the express intention of Canadians' elected representatives.
Decisions involving minority rights have often been controversial in Can-
ada, and judicial law making in this area has had profound implications across
the country. As an example, Leishman examines the role judges and tribunals
1. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).
2. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11 [Charter].
3. Supra note I at 19-46.
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have played in creating rights for sexual rhinorities. From a human rights per-
spective, these judicially-created rights are laudable; indeed, many (if not most)
Canadians likely approve of these decisions. However, Leishman's work is a
reminder that these decisions have consequences beyond the realm of human
rights. Indeed, these judicially-created rights (as Leishman characterizes them)
have fundamental implications for Canadian democracy: they are indicative
of the judiciary's willingness to make and modify laws in the post-Charter era.
To examine these democratic implications, the book canvasses a series
of decisions in which minority rights came into direct conflict with free-
dom of religion and freedom of expression. Balancing competing rights is
arguably one of the most delicate tasks a judge must perform, and Leish-
man probes the difficulties that arise when traditionally protected religion
and speech rights come into conflict with new judicially-created protections
for minority rights. Leishman questions whether it is legitimate to sub-
ordinate legislated rights to judicially-created rights-particularly since
the role of judges is "to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law."'
This conflict between legal interpretation and law making culminates in
an examination of the separation of powers in the book's final chapter. Leish-
man contends that the Charter has blurred the line between legal interpretation
and law making. According to him, the Charters broad language has meant that
judicial interpretation of the law -has often had the effect of creating new laws.
Based on this assessment, Leishman asserts that Parliament and provincial leg-
islatures have been held hostage by these judicial interpretations and that
they have been forced to bow to the will of the courts. He cautions that
"[n]ow that the policy of the federal and provincial governments upon
vital questions is routinely fixed by the Supreme Court, we, the Canadi-
an people, must candidly confess that we have ceased to be our own rulers."'
As a journalist and former political science lecturer, the author's colourful
style is a clear product of his background. Leishman presents his arguments in
a direct manner, although some readers may be taken aback by his blunt de-
livery. He does not hold back with his trenchant criticism of judicial activism,
even going so far as to remark of one eminent former Supreme Court justice
that "[t]ruly, nothing in his career as a judge became him like the leaving of
it."6 Whether one agrees with his position or not, Leishman's controver-
sial examination of the broader implications of post-Charter judicial activism
is an interesting read for anyone interested in human rights and civil liberties.
4. Ibid at 3.
5. Ibid at 272.
6. Ibid at 151.
